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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the idea that individuals have a moral and
constitutional right of control over the use of their thoughts vis-à-vis the
state. As a point of departure, I consider the prospect of a forensic
neuroimaging device that was capable of eliciting recall and recognition
from a criminal suspect without the suspect’s having even to answer an
interrogator’s question. Reflection on government access to this sort of
interrogation technique suggests that the state should be prohibited from
either extracting a person’s thoughts without her consent or making use
of her compelled thoughts to lay criminal blame upon her.
Though neither judges nor scholars have defended this account of
the right to silence in explicit terms, the notion of “mental control” I
shall develop here underlies much that is assumed about the relation
∗ Instructor in Bioethics and Law, Yale University; J.D. candidate, Yale Law School, 2010; D.Phil,
University of Oxford, 2007; A.B, Harvard College, 2004. Thanks to Jane Moriarty and the
University of Akron School of Law for inviting me to contribute to this symposium issue, and to the
participants of the Akron Neuroscience, Law & Government Symposium for trenchant discussion.
I’m grateful to Jason Fuller and the editors of Akron Law Review for guiding this piece to
publication. I owe a special debt to my professor Alex Stein, who made criminal procedure come
alive and who taught me much of what I have written here.
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between the Fifth Amendment and the values of freedom and privacy.
Advances in cognitive science and neurotechnology, by promising the
acquisition of incriminating information from a person’s brain in a way
that avoids traditional concerns about physical or psychological harm,
bring the moral and legal significance of mental control into sharp relief.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly lays out the
normative stakes and shows why existing accounts of the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination are ill-equipped to address the moral
and legal implications of safe and reliable forensic neuroscience. Part II
argues that brain imaging is importantly different, for Fifth Amendment
purposes, from all other forms of evidence, such as speaking, writing,
and nodding;1 photographic and video evidence;2 DNA, fingerprint and
breathalyzer tests;3 hair, saliva, and blood samples;4 voice and
handwriting exemplars for identification;5 appearance in a lineup6 or
wearing certain clothing;7 and even polygraph tests.8 What makes brain
imaging unique is that it enables state officials to obtain information
directly from a suspect’s brain, in a way that affords her no opportunity
to control the transmission of that information.
Part III examines the doctrinal distinction between “testimonial”
evidence, which is privileged by the Self Incrimination Clause, and
“physical” evidence, which is not. Three elements—compulsion,
incrimination, and testimony—must be present to trigger Fifth
Amendment protection.9 Since brain imaging could straightforwardly

1. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763.
2. See, e.g., People v. Hines, 938 P.2d 388 (Cal. 1997) (videos); Edwards v. Butler, 882 F.2d
160 (5th Cir. 1989) (photographs).
3. See, e.g., Wisconsin v Santana-Lopez, 613 N.W. 2d 918 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (DNA);
People v. Shaw, 531 N.E.2d 650, 651 (1988) (breathalyzer); Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106 (Alaska
1979) (breathalyzer).
4. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757; State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27 (Wash. 2007) (saliva).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) (voice); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) (handwriting); United States v.
Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting); United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980) (handwriting);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting).
6. See, e.g., Wade, 388 U.S. at 218; see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764, 764 n.8 (affirming
that Fifth Amendment does not protect against incriminating compulsion “to stand, to assume a
stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture”).
7. See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (holding that a per se exclusion
of polygraph evidence in a military court does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to present a
defense).
9. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). In addition to the compulsion,
incrimination, and testimony elements, a Fifth Amendment case must also arise under a matter of
criminal law. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766-67 (2003). Therefore, the privilege does
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qualify as both compelled and incriminating, as in the India murder case
above, the critical question is whether it counts as “testimonial.”10 This
Part argues that the Supreme Court counts evidence as “testimonial”
only when it conveys a suspect’s intention to communicate her
thoughts.11 The Court’s traditional understanding of this distinction
likely leaves a suspect without constitutional protection against the use
of compelled brain imaging to extract incriminating information from
her brain.
Part IV argues that the physical/testimonial distinction presupposes
a flawed conception of mind/body dualism.12 Exposing this dualism
reveals the normative significance we confer to a suspect’s control over
his thoughts against unwanted use by the government. It is for this
reason that the constitutional right to silence protects against involuntary
disclosures of knowledge or understandings from an unwilling suspect
for use in criminal prosecution against him. The use of compelled
neuroscientific evidence is illegitimate when it deprives the accused of
control over her mental life. This suggests that defendants may opt for
brain imaging to exculpate themselves, but that prosecutors may not
comment on a suspect’s decision to decline the testing, and that judges
should instruct jurors not to draw adverse inferences from a choice to
decline the testing.
II. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST COMPELLED SELF-INCRIMINATION
Imagine a safe, painless, and non-invasive interrogation device that
could ascertain thoughts and memories from an uncooperative suspect
with virtually 100% precision. Would the use of this incriminating
information to prosecute the suspect violate his right to silence?13 The
prospect of reliable truth detection is, to date, an unqualified fiction,
since even the most sophisticated technologies remain largely untested
not apply when the compelled information would lead to exclusively non-criminal sanctions, such
as the loss of a job or a license.
10. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966).
11. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990).
12. See Charles B. Nemeroff et al., Editorial, Functional Brain Imaging: Twenty-First
Century Phrenology or Psychobiological Advance for the Millennium? 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
671, 672 (1999) (“Neuroimaging offers a powerful probe of brain state, but we are now faced with
metaphysical questions; i.e., what is a brain state, and how is it related to the outward manifestations
of behavior? This has the potential for degenerating into the old mind-body duality of Descartes . . .
.”).
13. See Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible Legal
and Social Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN,
MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 114, 146 (Brian Garland ed., 2004).
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and prone to error. But advances in cognitive neuroscience, which make
it possible to measure the properties and processes of the brain in highresolution imagery, invite us to consider this question. Brain imaging
test results were admitted into evidence in a recent murder case in India.
In June 2008, police in Maharashtra, India took 24-year-old
student Aditi Sharma into custody as a suspect in the murder of her
former fiancé, Udit Bharati.14 Sharma and Bharati had been living
together in Pune when Sharma met another man and eloped with him to
Delhi. The following year, Sharma returned to Pune, where, according
to prosecutors, she asked Bharati to meet her at a McDonald’s and
laced his food with arsenic. Bharati died from the poisoning. Sharma
insisted she was innocent.
Police read Sharma her rights and asked her to sit for a brain
imaging test. Sharma agreed to the test. Officers strapped her onto a
high-tech gurney and fastened 32 electrodes to her head. The sensors
measured electrical brainwaves in response to targeted stimuli.
Investigators read Sharma first-person statements that corresponded to
their theory of the crime, as well as neutral statements to help the
software distinguish between Sharma’s actual remembrance and her
normal cognition. Sharma said nothing in reply, but the sensors were
able to measure and display her brainwave patterns to confirm that she
knew some of the statements were true and that some were false.
“I bought arsenic,” they said. And, “I met Udit at McDonald’s.”
For an hour, Sharma did nothing. But the parts of her brain where
memories are thought to be stored lit up on the screen when she heard
these statements. At the murder trial, the brain scans were admitted into
evidence. These neuroscientific test results persuaded Judge S.S.
Phansalkar-Joshi that Sharma had “experiential knowledge” of having
committed the murder. Sharma was convicted and sentenced to life in
prison.15
Assume, for the sake of argument, that the brain imaging technique
used in this case was highly reliable. Many people may nevertheless
think that police committed a grave moral and legal wrong by coercing
the disclosure of Sharma’s thoughts.16 The Supreme Court has

14. See Anand Giridharadas, Brain Scan a New Wave in Criminal Evidence, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Sept. 8, 2008, at 1; Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts is
Debated, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at A8.
15. See supra note 14.
16. See Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie Detection
and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 359, 371 (2007) (“[D]irect and unwanted
government access to our mental life is a chilling concept.”).
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speculated that the involuntary transmission of incriminating liedetection evidence would violate a suspect’s right to silence.17 “To
compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to
determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses,
whether willed or not,” Justice Brennan wrote in dicta for a 5-4 majority
in the 1966 case of Schmerber v. California,18 “is to evoke the spirit and
history of the Fifth Amendment.”19 Although the compelled-response
standard that Justice Brennan gestured toward in Schmerber was not
binding then, and is not applied by courts today, its widespread appeal
and influence remains.20 Presuming that neuroscience test results were
sufficiently reliable, however, existing accounts of the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination provide no support for Justice Brennan’s
reflections. This mismatch between right-to-silence principles, on the
one hand, and, on the other, widely held intuitions that the Fifth
Amendment should protect against compelled brain imaging, is the
anomaly that propels this inquiry into the implications of forensic
neuroscience for the Self-Incrimination Clause.
Justification for the right to silence is fraught with murkiness.
Many have observed an “ambiguous and sometimes contradictory
picture of the reasons underlying the Fifth Amendment’s enactment.”21
The privilege against compelled self-incrimination has origins as a
safeguard against government abuses such as the Roman Inquisition,
Star Chamber, and ex officio oaths of the ecclesiastical courts, long
forsaken in the modern judiciary.22 Commentators have referred to the

17. The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
18. 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
19. Id.
20. See infra Part II.
21. Peter Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal,
20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31, 36 (1982) (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968)); E.M. Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949); R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and
Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763
(1935)); see also R.H. Helmholz, Introduction, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION:
ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 6 (R.H. Helmholz et al. eds., 1997) (“Despite its reputation as a
foundation stone of common law jurisprudence, . . . the privilege as we know it is actually the
product of relatively recent choice.”) (citations omitted).
22. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956); Muniz, 496 U.S. at 595-98; Doe
v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988); see generally Frank Riebli, The Spectre of Star
Chamber: The Role of an Ancient English Tribunal in the Supreme Court’s Self-Incrimination
Jurisprudence, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 807 (2002).
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privilege as “schizophrenic,”23 an “unsolved riddle of vast proportions, a
Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights”24 that is incapable of
“be[ing] squared with any rational theory.”25 Even the Supreme Court
has conceded that while the right to silence is “an expression of the
moral striving of the community[,] . . . a reflection of our common
conscience,”26 it remains unclear “just what it is supposed to do or just
whom it is intended to protect.”27
Scholars and judges have articulated a number of ways to justify
the right to silence. Five are most prominent and compelling: (1) nonreliance on presumptively unreliable evidence28 which “the accused
reasonably believes . . . is within his power to affect the probative value
of the evidence sought;”29 (2) preservation of the credibility of innocent
defendants;30 (3) protection of innocents who fear poor performance on
cross-examination;31 (4) pardon of suspects who make a reasonable
decision to lie in their own defense,32 and (5) what scholars have called
the “original American justification”33—avoidance of the “cruel
trilemma” that forces a suspect to choose among self-accusation,
contempt of court, and perjury.34
Assuming that neuroforensic
technology was sufficiently reliable, however, none of these ways of
23. Stephen J. Shulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26
VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 311 (1992).
24. Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The SelfIncrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 857 (1995).
25. William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (1988).
26. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1964) (quoting DEAN ERWIN GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TODAY 73 (1955)).
27. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 56 n.5 (1964) (quoting
Harry Kalven, Jr., Invoking the Fifth Amendment—Some Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9
BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 181, 182 (1953)).
28. See Amar & Lettow, supra note 24.
29. B. Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination: Extorting
Physical Evidence from a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 598 (1970) (arguing that the SelfIncrimination Clause protects against psychologically intrusive compulsion of evidence).
30. See Daniel J. Seidman & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A GameTheoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430 (2000).
31. See Craig M. Bradley, Griffin v. California: Still Viable After All These Years, 79 MICH.
L. REV. 1290, 1294 (1981) (arguing that innocent defendants may choose not to testify at trial to
avoid adverse inferences on cross-examination as a result of anxiety, confusion, or prior
convictions).
32. Stuntz, supra note 25, at 1228-29.
33. See William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Taking Miranda’s Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REV.
813, 843 (2005); see also Peter Westen & Stewart Mandell, To Talk, To Balk, or To Lie: The
Emerging Fifth Amendment Doctrine of the “Preferred Response,” 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521, 53540 (1982).
34. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). See also Chavez
v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990).
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thinking about the privilege would bar the compelled use of certain brain
imaging techniques to extort information from a criminal suspect’s
brain.35
Consider the implications of reliable brain imaging evidence for
each of the justifications above. (1) Reliability concerns fall away with
an accurate brain imaging technique because “an effective and reliable
lie detector test deprives the individual of any opportunity to deceive the
questioner.”36 (2) Anxiety about the integrity of statements made by
innocent defendants is put to rest by an assurance that brain imaging
could accurately detect memories and capture truthfulness. (3) There
would be no reason to worry about innocent defendants getting flustered
by skillful prosecutors when neither the subject nor the examiner
exercised any control over the results of the test. (4) Nor would the
excuse theory have protected the suspect Sharma because “there [was]
no falsehood to excuse and therefore no need to immunize
noncooperation.”37 (5) And since neuroscience techniques could reliably
access Sharma’s responses in the absence of her participation, police
were able to obtain the incriminating information without her being put
to any choice among indictment, contempt, and perjury. So there was no
threat that Sharma would incur the psychological cruelty thought to
accompany a decision about whether to consent to her own punishment.
If we nonetheless recoil from the use of neurotechnology to extract
thoughts from an unwilling suspect, it will not do simply to affirm that
involuntary brain imaging “shocks the conscience” much like the
stomach pumping in Rochin v. California.38 Alternatively, we could
shake off our disquiet as so much confusion and try to fit forensic
neuroscience into the existing jurisprudence. Some scholars apply
common law distinctions to argue that brain imaging techniques are
unlikely to qualify for Fifth Amendment protection,39 while others make
the case that compelled neuroforensics could be readily protected by
reference to the line of right-to-silence opinions in the wake of
35. See Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure,
33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 333 (2006).
36. Arenella, supra note 21, at 44-45 n.70.
37. Stuntz, supra note 25, at 1276.
38. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). See Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave New World of
Interrogation Jurisprudence, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 341, 353 (2007).
39. See Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 16, at 369 (“[I]f control over results is a defining element
of a testimonial act, brain fingerprinting would not qualify as such.”); Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin
Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 243, 246 (2004) (providing a theory of the Self-Incrimination Clause that protects the
“substantive content of cognition”).
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Schmerber.40 No matter how descriptive or predictive these approaches
prove, as a matter of doctrine they remain morally unsatisfying to the
extent that they are “not normative or justificatory.”41 Explanatory
theories might account for Fifth Amendment doctrine in a convincing
way, but because they accept extant case law as legitimate and fixed,
their understanding of the right to silence must be tailored to capture
even anomalous or undesirable holdings. Yet the possibility that reliable
brain imaging would be admitted in the courtroom invites us to rethink
prevailing understandings of the privilege against compelled selfincrimination.
III. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND FORENSIC EVIDENCE
Attempts to detect lies in criminal suspects date back thousands of
years.42 In 900 B.C., Hindu interrogators sought to identify deceitful
behavior in criminal suspects by looking for physiological markers—
cagey movements, facial discoloration, or “speak[ing] nonsense,
rub[bing] the great toe along the ground, and shiver[ing]”—that were
thought to correspond to a deceitful state of mind.43 Centuries later, the
ordeals of Christian Europe sought to expose the guilty through
supernatural intervention that rarely saved the accused from hot irons,
boiling water, or drowning.44 Nineteenth-century Europe and the United
States saw the rise of phrenology to detect honest or deceptive character
by measuring the shape and contours of a subject’s head.45 Brain
imaging heralds a step in this project.
Contrary to some media portrayals,46 neurotechnologies cannot read
minds.47
Even the most advanced devices are not capable of
40. George M. Dery, Lying Eyes: Constitutional Implications of New Thermal Imaging Lie
Detection Technology, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 217, 248 (2004) (drawing on dicta in Schmerber to argue
that the use of involuntarily transmitted information to incriminate a suspect in a criminal trial is
“squarely within the scope of the Fifth Amendment[,]” while noting, however, that “Justice
Brennan’s ruminations on lie detectors” were not within the Court’s holding) (citation omitted).
Ronald Allen and Kristin Mace take a similar approach. Allen & Mace, supra note 39.
41. Allen & Mace, supra note 39, at 248.
42. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of
Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1166 (1993).
43. Paul V. Trovillo, History of Lie Detection, 29 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 848, 849
(1939).
44. See George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 585-86 (1997).
45. See Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877, 880 (1997).
46. See, e.g., Jerry Adler, Mind Reading, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9, 2004, at 42, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/54762 (regarding fMRI lie detection); Dennis O’Brien, Mind
Readers: Scanning Technology Promises to Map the Brain’s Pathways, but Some Fear Its Ability to
Expose a Patient’s Secrets and Lies, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 10, 2004, at 1E.
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ascertaining a subject’s moral beliefs, religious convictions, or
aspirations for the future.48 Nor can they establish any objective fact
about some state of affairs in the world.49 What brain imaging promises,
instead, is to determine a subject’s sensory recall or perceived
recognition—what a subject believes he saw, heard, or knows—about a
particular set of facts or about the state of past events.50 In a landmark
2002 study, Dr. Daniel Langleben and colleagues asked participants in a
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study to conceal the identity of a
five of clubs, while images of different playing cards appeared on the
screen along with the question whether the featured card was the one in
the subjects’ hand.51 Langleben and colleagues found conspicuous
differences between patterns of brain activity when subjects truthfully
denied having other cards and when they falsely denied having the five
of clubs.52 Subsequent studies successfully replicated Langleben’s
results.53 Further investigation has determined that truthful behavior,
because it is spontaneously facilitated, requires less cognitive control
and the use of fewer brain regions (primarily the hippocampus and left
prefrontal cortex, which store and regulate memory) than does deceptive
behavior, which utilizes greater cognitive control in discrete premotor
brain regions to produce the inhibitory feedback and conscious
calculation necessary to generate new (false) “memories.”54
47. See O’Brien, supra note 46.
48. See Donald Kennedy, Neuroimaging: Revolutionary Research Tool or a Post-Modern
Phrenology?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 19 (2005).
49. As Martha J. Farah and Paul Root Wolpe put it: “Although brainwaves do not lie, neither
do they tell the truth; they are simply measures of brain activity.” Martha J. Farah & Paul Root
Wolpe, Monitoring and Manipulating Brain Function: New Neuroscience Technologies and Their
Ethical Implications, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 2004, at 35, 40.
50. See Craig E.L. Stark & Larry R. Squire, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)
Activity in the Hippocampal Region During Recognition Memory, 20 J. NEUROSCIENCE 7776, 7776
(2000); John D.E. Gabrieli, Functional Neuroimaging of Episodic Memory, in HANDBOOK OF
FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING OF COGNITION 262 (Roberto Cabeza & Alan Kingstone eds., 2001).
51. See Daniel D. Lengleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An EventRelated Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 729 (2002).
52. See id. at 731.
53. See K. Luan Phan et al., Neural Correlates of Telling Lies: A Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging Study at 4 Tesla, 12 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 164, 171 (2005).
54. See, e.g., Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects with
Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262, 262 (2005); Jennifer Marie Nunez et al.,
Intentional False Responding Shares Neural Substrates with Response Conflict and Cognitive
Control, 25 NEUROIMAGE 267, 267 (2005); F. Andrew Kozel et al., A Pilot Study of Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in Healthy Young Men, 16 J.
NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 295 (2004); Frank Andrew Kozel et al., A
Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855
(2004); Giorgio Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI
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There are two classes of brain imaging devices that can be used for
purposes of memory detection.55 The first class seeks to measure blood
flow patterns in the brain;56 the second measures electrical activity
patterns in the brain.57 The first class of techniques relies on the fact that
blood flow in the brain differs when people lie as compared with when
they tell the truth.58 Blood flow patterns reflect metabolic and
circulatory adjustment resulting from increased brain activity,
independent of whether the subject makes any effort to conceal a
memory.59
Brain imaging techniques take advantage of neural
differences between truthful and deceptive behavior by measuring how
much blood is flowing to different parts of the brain in response to
targeted stimuli.60 The most commonly used method for measuring
blood flow in the brain, called functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI), uses a powerful magnet to identify changes in blood
oxygenation that occur when a person performs a mental activity, such
as viewing an image, answering a question, listening to a voice, or
telling a story.61 FMRI then projects a graphic representation of brain
activity with resolution that is an order of magnitude greater than what

Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 836 (2003); Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioural and
Functional Anatomical Correlates of Deception in Humans, 12 NEUROREPORT 2849, 2850 (2001).
55. See Robin Marantz Henig, Looking for the Lie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, § 6, at 47; Joan
O’C. Hamilton, Journey to the Center of the Mind: ‘Functional’ MRI Is Yielding a Clearer Picture
of What Thoughts Look Like, BUS. WK., Apr. 19, 2004, at 78; Faye Flam, Your Brain May Soon Be
Used Against You, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 29, 2002, at A01
56. See John-Dylan Haynes et al., Reading Hidden Intentions in the Human Brain, 17
CURRENT BIOLOGY 323 (2007); Paul Root Wolpe et al., Emerging Neurotechnologies for LieDetection: Promises and Perils, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 39, 39 (2005); Investigative Techniques—
Federal Agency Views on the Potential Application of “Brain Fingerprinting,” GAO REP. (Rep. No.
GAO-02-22), Oct. 31, 2001, available at 2001 WL 1560280
57. Carter Snead has distinguished “anatomical” neuroimaging techniques (those that are
“limited to the observation of the brain’s architecture”) from “functional” techniques (those that
“permit[ ] the construction of computerized images that measure the brain’s activity with varying
degrees of temporal and anatomical resolution, depending on the technology employed.”). O.
Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265,
1281 (2007) (citation omitted).
58. See Luis Hernandez et al., Temporal Sensitivity of Event-Related fMRI, 17 NEUROIMAGE
1018, 1025 (2002).
59. See Steven D. Forman et al., Improved Assessment of Significant Activation in Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI): Use of a Cluster-Size Threshold, 33 MAGNETIC RESONANCE
MED. 636 (1995).
60. F. Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605, 611 (2005).
61. See David G. Norris, Principles of Magnetic Resonance Assessment of Brain Function, 23
J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 794, 794 (2006); RICHARD B. BUXTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 23-45 (2002).
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was not long ago the most precise brain imaging technology, the
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scan.62
The reliability of fMRI is not uncontroversial.63 While a private
company called “No Lie MRI” purports to achieve 90% accuracy in
detecting deception,64 critics note the low number of research subjects
studied in widely cited fMRI research experiments.65 Some experts
suggest that the changes in blood flow that fMRI measures are too small
to yield any significant information about the content of activity in the
brain.66 Others argue that increased blood flow could result from
neurological processes other than efforts to conceal, including a
subject’s anxiety with the claustrophobic machine or an emotional state
that is heightened for some other reason unrelated to the cognitive
processes for which the fMRI tests.67 Still others claim that blood flow
patterns do not actually signify output activity in the brain at all, but
rather input activity.68 Furthermore, since the fMRI machine requires
that a subject’s head remain still for several hours, even a small physical
movement can impede the scanner’s ability to obtain data on blood flow
patterns.69 Finally, fMRI may call for voluntary participation from a
subject who must be willing to answer a question or otherwise register a

62. See Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Brain Mapping of Deception and Truth Telling About an
Ecologically Valid Situation: Functional MR Imaging and Polygraph Investigation—Initial
Experience, 238 RADIOLOGY 679 (2006).
63. See Margaret Talbot, Duped, NEW YORKER, June 2, 2007, at 52-61.
64. See Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need
for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 392 (2007) (citing No Lie MRI, Market Opportunities,
http://www.noliemri.com/investors/MarketOpportunity.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2009)).
65. See David I. Donaldson, Parsing Brain Activity with fMRI and Mixed Designs: What Kind
of a State is Neuroimaging in?, 27 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCES 442 (2004).
66. See Sandra Blakeslee, Just What’s Going On Inside that Head of Yours?, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2000, at F6.
67. Orrin Devinsky and Mark D’Esposito explain:
When a subject performs a task during imaging, it is difficult to demonstrate
conclusively that he or she is differentially engaging a single, identified cognitive
process. The subject may engage in unwanted cognitive processes that either have no
overt, measurable effects or are perfectly confounded with the process of interest.
Consequently, the neural activity measured by the functional neuroimaging technique
may result from some confounding neural computation that is itself not necessary for
executing the cognitive process under study.
ORRIN DEVINSKY & MARK D’ESPOSITO, NEUROLOGY OF COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL
DISORDERS 53-54 (Oxford U.P. 2003).
68. See Sandie Cleland, What Does fMRI Actually Measure?, 17 PSYCHOLOGIST 388 (2004).
69. See Randy L. Buckner & Jessica M. Logan, Functional Neuroimaging Methods: PET and
fMRI, in HANDBOOK OF FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING OF COGNITION 28, 30 (Robert Cabeza &
Alan Kingstone eds., 2001).
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response to specific stimuli.70
For the second class of
neurotechnologies, however, there is no need for a subject’s cooperation
in order to acquire information from his or her brain.71
This second class of technologies relies on the fact that every piece
of information in a person’s brain is stored by specific neurons, which
fire when the brain recognizes that information, producing electrical
activity.72 This electrical activity is a direct measure of informationprocessing in the brain.73 Neurotechnologies can measure these
electrical brainwaves through the use of electroencephalographic (EEG)
sensors attached to the scalp.74 By measuring electrical brainwaves in
response to targeted stimuli, the EEG technique, also known as “brain
fingerprinting,” can ascertain the presence or absence of information in a
subject’s brain, thereby confirming or denying the subject’s familiarity
with a particular event or image, such as a photograph of a crime scene,
victim’s face, or murder weapon under investigation.75
Other
neuroimaging techniques within this second class, including functional
near-infrared light technology (fNIR), which reflects infrared light off
the frontal cortex,76 and thermographic technology, which detects heat
emanating from the skin of the face,77 are less reliable than EEG.
Brain fingerprinting suffers from limited testing outside of the
laboratory78 as well as empirical shortcomings, including the risk of false
negative and false positive results.79 Because the EEG sensors measure
electrical activity associated with recognition, the subject needs to have
retained the targeted information in his or her brain for brain
fingerprinting to work.80 If the subject has experience with the targeted
70. See Scott M. Hayes et al., An fMRI Study of Episodic Memory: Retrieval of Object,
Spatial, and Temporal Information, 118 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 885, 886 (2004).
71. See Jonathan Knight, The Truth About Lying, 428 NATURE 692, 692-94 (2004).
72. See Kenneth R. Foster et al., Bioethics and the Brain, 40 IEEE SPECTRUM 34, 36 (2003).
73. See Helen Pearson, Lure of Lie Detectors Spooks Ethicists, 441 NATURE 918, 918-19
(2006).
74. Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, Scientific Procedure, Research, and Applications,
http://www.brainwavescience.com/TechnologyOverview.php (last visited July 29, 2008).
75. See id.
76. Meltem Izzetoglu et al., Functional Near-Infrared Neuroimaging, IEEE TRANSACTIONS
ON NEURAL SYSTEMS REHABILITATION ENGINEERING 153, 156-58 (2005).
77. See Dean A. Pollina et al., Facial Skin Surface Temperature Changes During a
“Concealed Information” Test, 34 ANNALS BIOMED. ENGINEERING 1182, 1183 (2006).
78. See Slaughter v. State, 105 P.3d 832, 835 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (“[W]e have no real
evidence that Brain Fingerprinting has been extensively tested . . . .”).
79. See Yukiyasu Kamitani & Frank Tong, Decoding the Visual and Subjective Contents of
the Human Brain, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 679, 679 (2005).
80. Michael S. Beauchamp, Functional MRI for Beginners, 5 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 397,
398 (2002) (reviewing RICHARD B. BUXTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC
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information, but fails to remember it due to a head injury, for example,
the EEG sensors will detect only the subject’s incomplete familiarity,
producing a false negative.81 If, on the other hand, the targeted
information is familiar to the subject for some reason other than its
association with the crime, then a false positive result will follow.82 So
if the subject happened to collect the same kind of gun as the murder
weapon, or if he or she saw a representation of the crime scene on
television, then these stimuli would indicate the subject’s familiarity
with the information in question, even though this conclusion would be
misleading.83
In spite of these limitations, brain fingerprinting has been admitted
into evidence in a 2003 criminal case, Iowa v. Harrington,84 which
involved voluntary EEG testing in a post-conviction relief action.85 In
1977, seventeen year-old Terry Harrington was found guilty of firstdegree murder in the shooting death of a retired police officer.86
Harrington claimed he had spent the night in question at a concert with
friends, several of whom confirmed his alibi at trial.87 But one witness,
Kevin Hughes, testified that he and Harrington had driven to a
dealership that night to steal a car, and that Harrington had shot and
killed the retired officer who was working as a night watchman at the
lot.88 A jury convicted Harrington and sentenced him to life in prison.89

RESONANCE IMAGING: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES (2002) and FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC
RESONANCE IMAGING: AN INTRODUCTION TO METHODS (Peter Jezzard et al. eds., 2001)).
81. See Tom Buller, Can We Scan for Truth in a Society of Liars?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 58, 59
(2005).
82. See Fang Fang et al., Lie Detection with Contingent Negative Variation, 50 INT’L J.
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 247, 252-53 (2003); Kelly Joyce, Appealing Images: Magnetic Resonance
Imaging and the Production of Authoritative Knowledge, 35 SOC. STUD. SCI. 437, 450 (2005).
83. J. Peter Rosenfeld et al., Simple, Effective Countermeasures to P300-based Tests of
Detection of Concealed Information, 41 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 205 (2004).
84. 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003).
85. See id. at 515.
86. See State v. Harrington, 284 N.W.2d 244, 245 (Iowa 1979).
87. See State v. Harrington, 659 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Iowa 2003); see also Lawrence A.
Farwell, Supplement to Forensic Science Report: Brain Fingerprinting Test on Terry Harrington,
Re: State of Iowa vs. Terry Harrington in the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County at
Council Bluff, http://www.brainwavescience.com/HarringtonSupplement.php (last visited July 29,
2008).
88. See Harrington, 284 N.W.2d at 248.
89. See id. at 245; see also Harrington v. State, 458 N.W.2d 874 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (initial
post-conviction relief action); Harrington v. Nix, 983 F.2d 872, 874 (8th Cir.1993) (federal habeas
relief action).
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Twenty-three years later, forensic neuroscience gave Harrington
another chance.90 In 2000, a trial judge admitted exculpatory EEG test
results as grounds to open a post-conviction relief claim.91 After a daylong hearing featuring three expert witnesses, Judge Ternus cited several
patents92 and publications93 to conclude that the Brain Fingerprinting
technique satisfied reliability standards for legal admissibility under
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.94 The neuroscientific expert
in Harrington was Dr. Lawrence Farwell, the scientist who developed
the EEG technique, and founder and chief scientist of Brain
Fingerprinting Laboratories.95 First, Farwell conducted a test based on

90. See Andre A. Moenssens, Brain Fingerprinting—Can it be Used to Detect the Innocence
of Persons Charged with a Crime?, 70 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 891, 916 (2002).
91. See Harrington v. Iowa, No. PCCV 073247 (Pottawattamie County D.C. Iowa, Nov. 14,
2000). See also Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 515-16 (citing Iowa Code § 822.2(4) (1999)). Cf. U.S.
v. Taveras, 570 F. Supp. 2d 481, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Confrontation rights and hearsay
exclusions in practice are designed to protect defendants against inculpation, not to limit their use
for exculpation.” (citing Dale A. Nance, Allocating the Risk of Error: Its Role in the Theory of
Evidence Law, in 13 LEGAL THEORY 129, 157 (2007) (reviewing ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF
EVIDENCE LAW (2005)) (“[A] defendant is entitled to adduce in his or her defen[s]e any evidence—
hearsay or non-hearsay—if that evidence is the best evidence available.”) (internal alterations
omitted).
92. Method and Apparatus for Multifaceted Electroencephalographic Response Analysis
(MERA), U.S. Patent No. 5,363,858 (filed May 5, 1993) (issued Nov. 15, 1994); Method and
Apparatus for Truth Detection, U.S. Patent No. 5,406,956 (filed Feb. 11, 1993) (issued Apr. 18,
1995); Method for Electroencephalographic Information Detection, U.S. Patent No. 5,467,777 (filed
Sep. 15, 1994) (issued Nov. 21, 1995).
93. John J. Allen, William G. Iacono & Kurt D. Danielson, The Identification of Concealed
Memories Using the Event-Related Potential & Implicit Behavioral Methods: A Methodology for
Prediction in the Face of Individual Differences, 29 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 504 (1992); Lawrence A.
Farwell & Emanuel Donchin, The Brain Detector: P300 in the Detection of Deception, 24
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 434 (1986); Lawrence A. Farwell et al., Optimal Digital Filters for LongLatency Components of the Event-Related Brain Potential, 30 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 306 (1993);
Lawrence A. Farwell & Emanuel Donchin, Talking Off the Top of Your Head: Toward a Mental
Prosthesis Utilizing Event-Related Brain Potentials, 70 ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY & CLINICAL
NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 510 (1988); Lawrence A. Farwell & Emanuel Donchin, The Truth Will Out:
Interrogative Polygraphy (“Lie Detection”) with Event-Related Brain Potentials, 28
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 531 (1991); Lawrence A. Farwell, Two New Twists on the Truth Detector:
Brain-Wave Detection of Occupational Information, 29 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 20 (1992); Lawrence
A. Farwell, The Brain-Wave Information Detection (BID) System: A New Paradigm for
Psychophysiological Detection of Information (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).
94. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In addition to “general acceptability” by the relevant scientific
community, Daubert standards require rigorous testing, published peer-review, and demonstration
of an acceptably low rate of error. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583, 591-94; see also, Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (C.A.D.C. 1923) (discussing “general acceptability”); General Electric
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
95. See Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, http://www.brainwavescience.com (last visited
July 29, 2008).
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details about the crime scene that would be known only to the
perpetrator and investigators.
The test concluded, with 99.9%
confidence, that the information was absent from Harrington’s brain.96
Then, Farwell tested unique details about the concert that Harrington
claimed to have been at on the night of the murder for which he was
convicted.97 The test found with similar confidence that the information
was present.98
While the EEG results were not dispositive in Harrington—the
Iowa Supreme Court instead granted Harrington a new trial on the basis
of a Brady violation99—when confronted with the test results, the single
eyewitness, Kevin Hughes, recanted his testimony and confessed to
perjuring himself at the original trial.100 Upon reversal and remand, the
prosecution announced that it was dismissing the case on the grounds
that the “admissible evidence which is left after 26 years is not sufficient
to sustain a conviction against Mr. Harrington.”101 After 25 years in jail,
Terry Harrington was freed. It remains to be seen whether other state or
federal courts will admit brain fingerprinting as evidence.
Having reviewed some of the capacities and limitations of the two
major classes of neurotechnology and focused attention on the class that
measures brainwaves, we are in a position to see what makes
neuroforensic techniques such as electroencephalography different from
traditional lie-detection methods like the polygraph machine.
Polygraphy measures the physiological reactions that follow from
emotional responses.102 These reactions are thought to express
themselves as detectable changes in the peripheral nervous system.103
While the subject is being interviewed, therefore, the polygraph machine
monitors changes in a subject’s perspiration (by attaching metal sensors
to the fingers or palms), breathing rate (using rubber tubes wrapped
around the chest), and blood pressure and heart rate (with an arm
cuff).104 A problem with the polygraph is that a subject may be able to

96. See Farwell, supra note 87.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 522 (Iowa 2003).
100. Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, Brain Fingerprinting Testing Helps to Exonerate Man
Falsely Convicted of Murder, http://www.brainwavescience.com/HarringtonSummary.php (last
visited July 29, 2008).
101. Mark Siebert, Free Man, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 25, 2003, at B8.
102. American
Polygraph
Association,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
http://www.polygraph.org/faq (last visited Aug. 20, 2008).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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control and learn to manipulate his or her emotional responses, and
hence the physiological reactions that the machine is able to account
for.105 Subjects have been able to “fool” the polygraph machine by
using simple counter-measures like stressors, such as flexing muscles or
placing tacks in a shoe, to induce or inflate physiological responses, or
sedatives, such as barbiturates or minor tranquilizers, to depress the
central nervous system and dampen stress reactions.106 That the
polygraph is not immune to bluffing renders the test unreliable for
purposes of lie-detection and truth-verification.107
Neuroscientific forensic technology is not just high-tech
polygraphy. Unlike the polygraph test, which gauges a subject’s
emotional response to the act of lying, brain imaging techniques
ascertain the neurological processes required for a subject’s brain even
to produce a lie.108 The application of cognitive neuroscience enables
interrogators to sidestep the peripheral nervous system in order to gain
direct access to the workings of the brain.109 Whereas the polygraph
measures controllable physical manifestations of emotional tension,
brain fingerprinting techniques measure involuntary brain activation.110
105. See American Psychological Association, The Truth About Lie Detectors (aka Polygraph
Tests), PSYCHOL. MATTERS, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.psychologymatters.org/polygraphs.html;
Susan
McCarthy,
Passing
the
Polygraph,
SALON,
Mar.
2,
2000,
http://archive.salon.com/health/feature/2000/03/02/liedetection/index.html.
106. See Dan Eggen & Shankar Vedantam, Polygraph Results often in Question: CIA, FBI
Defend Test’s Use in Probes, WASH. POST, May 1, 2006, at A1.
107. See
American
Polygraph
Assoication,
Polygraph
Validity
Research,
http://www.polygraph.org/validity-research (last visited Aug. 20, 2008). The American Polygraph
Association (APA), which oversees scientific research and development, establishes methodologies
and procedures, and maintains qualifying standards and licensing tests for all polygraph examiners
in the United States, suggests that reliability rates for modern polygraph techniques approach
ninety-two percent. See id. See also Concerns over Use of Polygraphs: Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 5-8 (2001) (statement of Michael H. Capps, Deputy
Director for Developmental Programs, Defense Security Service), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov (“There is common agreement in the scientific community that modern
polygraph techniques do produce [results] usually in excess of 90% . . . this compares favorably
with many other common techniques in the behavioral sciences.”).
108. Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 15 HUM.
BRAIN MAPPING 157, 163 (2002).
109. G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation,
13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 830 (2003) (noting that fMRI techniques make it possible to “examine
directly the organ that produces lies, the brain”).
110. To the extent that fMRI, like polygraphy, requires the subject to speak his responses to
external stimuli provided by the government, this type of neuroforensic technique is somewhat less
interesting for purposes of Fifth Amendment inquiry, since spoken communications are generally
protected under the privilege. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988) (“The vast
majority of verbal statements thus will be testimonial” because “[t]here are very few instances in
which a verbal statement, either oral or written, will not convey information or assert facts.”).
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The extra “work” that it requires for a subject’s brain to create a new
memory occurs independent of stress levels, and cannot be effectively
controlled.111
The
primary
cognitive
processes
that
electroencephalography measures are thus far more difficult to
dissimulate than the physical manifestation of secondary emotional
responses that are measured by the polygraph.112 As one commentator
puts it: “[E]ven a trained counter-spy must use creativity and calculation
to formulate a new lie, and the most nervous Nellie will use memory to
recount an event in her past.”113 Not only is intentionally bluffing the
EEG machine not an option; neither is overriding memory detection
unintentionally.
Brain fingerprinting can detect even good-faith
mistaken responses, since the machine identifies the brain activity
required to create the new memory, whether the lie was deliberate or
inadvertent.114 Moreover, the use of non-human examiners renders
neurotechnologies less vulnerable to test bias than polygraphy.115
Polygraph tests are performed by human interrogation and interpreted by
human examiners, whose behavior and judgment can affect test
results.116 With EEG, by contrast, the subject is presented test questions
on a computer screen and the analysis of brain activity is displayed in
high-resolution imaging and performed using computer software.117 All
this renders brain fingerprinting far more reliable, or at least potentially
so, than traditional lie-detection techniques like polygraph testing.
IV. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TESTIMONIAL AND PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE
Whether brain fingerprinting is privileged by right-to-silence
jurisprudence turns on whether it counts as “testimonial” evidence,
which is protected by the Fifth Amendment, or “physical” evidence,
which is not. There are three factors—compulsion, incrimination, and
111. See Lee et al., supra note 108, at 163 (“controlling one’s cerebral activity to avoid
detection is unfeasible”).
112. See id.
113. Leo Kittay, Note, Admissibility of FMRI Lie Detection: The Cultural Bias Against “Mind
Reading” Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351, 1355 (2007).
114. Judy Illes & Eric Racine, Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge Informed by
Genetics, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 5, 9-10 (2005).
115. See Paul C. Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence: Post-Daubert, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 905
(1998).
116. See id. (“The examiner’s role cannot be overstated, because it is the examiner who decides
whether there is sufficient indication of deception.”).
117. Steve Silberman, Don’t Even Think About Lying: How Brain Scans are Reinventing the
Science of Lie Detection, WIRED MAG., Jan. 2006, at 142.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 3, Art. 5

4/27/2009 12:44 PM

FOX

780

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[42:763

testimony—that must be present to warrant constitutional scrutiny under
the Fifth Amendment.118 The third factor—testimony—is where the
action is.119 Courts have struggled to make sense of what counts as
“testimonial” evidence in this “admittedly abstract and under-determined
area of law.”120 This same challenge applies to forensic neuroscience.
It is not difficult to imagine that brain fingerprinting would qualify
as unambiguously compelled—in the sense that, “considering the totality
of the circumstances, the free will of the [subject] was overborne”121—
and unambiguously incriminating—in the sense that it “could be used in
a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so
used.”122 What is less clear is whether EEG evidence would qualify as
“testimonial.”123 The Supreme Court has held that a person is a
“witness” against himself for purposes of the Fifth Amendment when he
is “compelled to testify . . . or otherwise provide the State with evidence
of a testimonial or communicative nature.”124 To count as testimonial,
as opposed to physical, the communication must, “explicitly or
implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.”125
The seminal case in the history of the physical/testimonial
distinction came more than forty years ago, in Schmerber v.
California.126 Schmerber presented the Supreme Court with the issue of
whether the use of compelled blood tests to incriminate a defendant
violated his constitutional right to silence.127 Armando Schmerber, after

118. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment does not
independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but
applies only when the accused is compelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is
incriminating.”). In addition to the compulsion, incrimination, and testimony elements, a case must
also arise under matter of criminal law for the privilege to apply. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S.
760, 766-67 (2003). So there is no Fifth Amendment protection when the compelled information
would lead to exclusively non-criminal sanctions, such as the loss of a job or a license.
119. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762-63 (1966) (noting that “[h]istory and a long
line of authorities in lower courts have consistently limited” the right to silence to situations
involving compelled testimonial evidence).
120. United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1999), aff’d, 530 U.S. 27 (2000);
see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting) (“These words [testimonial and physical]
are not models of clarity and precision as the Court’s rather labored explication shows.”).
121. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534, 544 (1961)).
122. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 455 (1972).
123. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763-64.
124. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
125. Id.
126. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
127. Id. at 758. Schmerber also raised Due Process, Fourth Amendment, and Sixth Amendment
right to counsel claims. The Court rejected each. Id. at 759-72.
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drinking at a local bowling alley, drove his car into a tree.128 While at
the hospital receiving treatment for injuries sustained in the crash,
Schmerber was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and
instructed to submit to a blood test to determine his level of
intoxication.129 When Schmerber refused, the arresting officer directed
the attending doctor to withdraw a blood sample from his body even
so.130
Laboratory analysis of Schmerber’s blood “indicated
intoxication.”131 At trial, California prosecutors presented the results of
Schmerber’s blood test, over his objections, as evidence that he had been
driving drunk.132 Schmerber was convicted.133
Schmerber appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing
that the government’s use of the involuntary blood test to establish his
guilt violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination.134 The Supreme Court dismissed his claim. In a five-tofour decision, the Court held that the use of the blood test to convict
Schmerber did not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause because that
evidence, although it was obtained from Schmerber against his will, was
properly characterized as “physical,” as opposed to “testimonial.”135
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan explained that the Fifth
Amendment privilege excluded “physical” evidence, such as
fingerprints, handwriting exemplars, appearance in a lineup, or, as in the
case before the Court, a blood sample.136 While Schmerber’s blood may
“testify” to something, Louis Seidman explains, “it does so in a purely
physical fashion without implicating his interior, mental life.”137 Justice
Brennan affirmed that the right to silence is limited in scope to evidence
like a written confession or verbal communication, which is actively
“testimonial” in nature.138
Writing in dissent, Justice Black rejected the distinction between
physical and testimonial evidence on grounds of conceptual coherency

128. Id. at 758.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 759.
131. Id. at 757.
132. Id. at 758-59.
133. Id. at 757.
134. Id. at 758.
135. Id. at 765.
136. Id. at 765 (arguing that the blood test and its results did not involve “even a shadow of
testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused”).
137. Louis M. Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal Law
and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 131-32 (1996).
138. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
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and normative desirability.139 On the coherency objection, Justice Black
argued that so-called physical evidence like a blood test is the functional
equivalent of oral testimony, in the sense that both are extracted from the
suspect himself and that both may be comparably persuasive to the jury
that will determine the suspect’s verdict.140 The distinction between
physical and testimonial evidence was therefore a distinction without
difference in Justice Black’s view. On the desirability objection, Justice
Black remarked that “[i]t is a strange hierarchy of values that allows the
State to extract a human being’s blood to convict him of a crime because
of the blood’s content but proscribes compelled production of his lifeless
papers.”141
In defending the physical/testimonial distinction, Justice Brennan
drew for support on John Henry Wigmore’s classical Evidence treatise142
and on Justice Holmes’s opinion more than half a century earlier in Holt
v. United States.143 Wigmore cited the case of Block v. People144 to
argue that since “the public interest in obtaining [incriminating]
evidence is usually sufficient to outweigh by a clear margin the private
interests sacrificed in the process,” only testimonial compulsion was
protected by the right to silence.145 Wigmore limited the bounds of
“testimony” to those beliefs of the accused that have been extracted for
government use:
Unless some attempt is made to secure a communication—written, oral
or otherwise—upon which reliance is to be placed as involving his
consciousness of the facts and the operations of his mind in expressing
it, the demand made upon him is not a testimonial one.146

Fingerprinting, blood tests, and appearance in a lineup did not
qualify as testimonial, Wigmore argued, because these forms of

139. Id. at 773 (Black, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 774.
141. Id. at 775. “Lifeless papers” referred to the Court’s opinion in Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886), in which the Court held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments create a zone of
privacy into which the government cannot intrude by using his books and papers as evidence against
him in a criminal proceeding. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 621-22. The holding in Boyd has since been
rejected in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) and United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605
(1984).
142. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
143. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
144. 240 P.2d 512 (Colo. 1951). “The purpose of the amendment against self-incrimination is
to prevent a man from being compelled to utter words that will incriminate him, and not to
obliterate all evidence of physical facts showing who and in what condition he is.” Id. at 516.
145. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 142, at § 2265.
146. Id.
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evidence did not involve revelation of the suspect’s knowledge.147 Holt
involved the appeal of a murder conviction on the ground, among others,
that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated when he was
forced to try on an incriminating shirt to show that it fit him.148 Writing
for the Court, Justice Holmes rejected the defendant’s claim as “an
extravagant extension of the 5th Amendment.”149 He distinguished
government compulsion as used, on the one hand, “to extort
communications from [the defendant],” and, on the other hand, to use
the defendant’s “body as evidence when it may be material.”150 Justice
Holmes applied a reductio ad absurdum to argue that the right to silence
does not protect against compelled evidence from the defendant’s
body.151 To extend Fifth Amendment protection to such physical
evidence would, “in principle[,] . . . forbid a jury to look at a prisoner
and compare his features with a photograph in proof.”152 To avoid this
implausible conclusion, Justice Holmes restricted the privilege against
self-incrimination to “communications.”153
In Schmerber, the Court applied this same distinction between
“‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’”154 and “real or physical
evidence.”155 Justice Brennan explained that whether evidence counts as
physical or testimonial depends on whether the process by which the
evidence was acquired or evaluated “implicated” the suspect’s
“testimonial capacities.”156
The privilege applied to testimonial
communications broadly, in “whatever form they might take,” whether
word of mouth, written notes, or communicative body language such as
pointing or nodding.157 The drawing of Schmerber’s blood, although
both compelled and incriminating, did not involve his testimonial
capacities and did not relate to other written or verbal communications
by the defendant.158 The blood test therefore qualified as “physical”
evidence, so it was not protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause.159

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
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Id. at 252.
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Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
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Id. at 765.
Id. at 763-64.
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Justice Brennan reaffirmed the basic distinction between physical
and testimonial evidence in the Court’s next term. United States v.
Wade160 involved a suspect accused of robbing a bank at gunpoint,
disguised with “a small strip of tape on each side of his face.”161 Police
later arrested him and placed in a line-up alongside him several other
prisoners, each of whom “wore strips of tape such as allegedly worn by
the robber,” and repeated the robber’s words: “put the money in the
bag.”162 Witnesses to the robbery relied on the lineup to identify the
suspect as the robber. Rejecting the suspect’s Fifth Amendment claim,
Justice Brennan wrote for the majority:
We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely to exhibit his
person for observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves
no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial
significance. It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical
characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might
have.163

Nor did forcing the suspect to “utter words purportedly uttered by
the robber” constitute testimonial evidence, since his voice was used
merely as “an identifying physical characteristic, not to speak his
guilt.”164 Having found that neither forced appearance in the robber’s
disguise nor forced vocalization of the phrase used during the robbery
counted as testimonial, Justice Brennan concluded that evidence
provided in the lineup was “not within the cover of the privilege.”165
Justice Brennan reached the same result in applying the
physical/testimonial distinction to the handwriting exemplar the suspect
in Gilbert v. California166 provided to the state to compare against a
handwritten robbery note demanding money from the Mutual Savings
and Loan Association of Alhambra.167 Although a person’s “voice and
handwriting are, of course, means of communication,” Justice Brennan
conceded, “[i]t by no means follows . . . that every compulsion of an
accused to use his voice or write compels a communication within the
cover of the privilege.”168 Given that the “voice recordings were . . .
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

388 U.S. 218 (1967).
Id. at 218.
Id.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 224.
388 U.S. 263 (1967).
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265.
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used solely to measure the physical properties of the witnesses’ voices,
[and] not for the testimonial or communicative content of what was to be
said,”169 this mere exemplar, “like the voice or body itself, is an
identifying physical characteristic outside its protection.”170 Exemplar
cases do not qualify as testimonial because although the act of speaking
specified words or signing one’s name or trying on certain clothes,
without more, conveys comprehension of and response to a command,
no substantive information is thereby communicated to the government.
By 1967, the Self-Incrimination Clause excluded from its coverage
appearance in a lineup or in certain clothes, and voice or handwriting
exemplars. These were not testimonial kinds of evidence, the Court
said, and so were, like Schmerber’s blood test, beyond the purview of
the Fifth Amendment.
Returning to Schmerber, Justice Brennan noted that the “privilege
[against self-incrimination] has never been given the full scope which
the values it helps to protect suggest,”171 but ruminated on further
extensions of the right to silence. Speaking to circumstances that lay
beyond the facts of the case, Justice Brennan addressed in dicta the
question of whether the logic that makes compelled blood tests immune
to the Fifth Amendment also applies to compelled polygraphs.172 Justice
Brennan reasoned that even though a polygraph, like a blood test,
measures physical processes, lie-detection may nevertheless count as
testimonial because “[s]ome tests seemingly directed to obtain ‘physical
evidence,’ for example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body
function during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting
responses which are essentially testimonial.”173 Justice Brennan
continued: “To compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort
will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of
physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and
history of the Fifth Amendment.”174 Were Justice Brennan’s musings
the privilege central to the holding in Schmerber, those words would
169. Id. at 269.
170. Id. at 266.
171. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966).
172. Id. at 764.
173. Id.
174. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Brennan’s conclusion that involuntary lie detector evidence
might be barred by the Self-Incrimination Clause is again consistent with Wigmore’s discussion of
the physical/testimonial distinction. Wigmore noted the difficulty in classifying the use of truth
serums or polygraphs in cases where “not only is the person’s affirmative participation essential (at
least in the form of physical responses) but his knowledge, despite his will to the contrary, is
extracted.” 8 WIGMORE, supra note 142, at § 2265.
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presumably apply to protect a criminal suspect from the use of brain
imaging to extract incriminating information from her brain, even as she
exercised no control over the transmission of the information.
In subsequent decades, however, the Court interpreted the
physical/testimonial distinction as turning on whether the process of
disclosing incriminating information bears testimonial qualities, as
opposed to whether the product of that information is testimonial.175 For
evidence to count as “testimonial” on this account, the process by which
the government acquires information from the suspect must convey his
active and intended transmission of internal knowledge about the outside
world. There are good reasons for emphasizing the process of evidencegathering over the product of information thereby revealed. On Daniel
Seidman and Alex Stein’s anti-pooling account of the privilege, for
example, the lies of a guilty suspect should not be immune from moral
or legal censure because, by masquerading as the truths of an innocent
suspect, these lies compromise the credibility of all innocent suspects in
defending themselves.176 Focusing on the process of evidentiary
disclosure captures this ability of guilty suspects to manipulate
incriminating information and thereby hurts the innocent by rendering
their truthful appeals unreliable.177 Giving attention instead to the
product of incriminating information would fail to capture this reliability
element of compelled evidence that serves to help innocent suspects.
On this understanding of the physical/testimonial distinction, the
important fact in Schmerber is that the accused did not play a conscious
or purposeful role in the transfer of incriminating information to the
government, since he was an unwilling donor for bodily material that
was examined by a chemical analysis likewise beyond his control.178
Since Schmerber’s blood did not “belong” to him in the way that his
thoughts do, Louis Seidman explains, sticking a needle in his arm
deprived Schmerber of any intentional participation that could qualify
his blood test as “testimonial.”179 The results of the blood test in
Schmerber counted as physical evidence “not simply because the
evidence concerned the suspect’s physical body,” the Court would later
175. See Allen & Mace, supra note 39, at 276. But see H. Richard Uviller, Foreword: Fisher
Goes on the Quintessential Fishing Expedition and Hubbell is Off the Hook, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 311, 320-21 (2001) (observing that derivative protection in United States v. Hubbell
“comes perilously close to treating the contents of a document as the indirect product of its
production”).
176. Seidman & Stein, supra note 30, at 453 n.79.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 475-76.
179. Seidman, supra note 137, at 131-32.
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write, but also because of Schmerber’s passive role in providing the
evidence.180 Schmerber’s progeny followed this process-based (as
opposed to product-based) approach to defining testimonial evidence for
purposes of the protection under the Fifth Amendment.
The Court’s subpoena cases are instructive. The Self-Incrimination
Clause has been held to protect not the product, or informational
content, of whatever is produced in response to the subpoena, but rather
the process of providing a specified entity. Compare the application of
the physical/testimonial distinction when faced with a subpoena to
produce known tax forms in Fisher v. United States,181 as opposed to a
subpoena to produce underspecified documents in United States v.
Hubbell.182 In Fisher, the privilege did not apply because the product of
the subpoena papers was already known by the government, so the
process by which the suspect disclosed the information involved an
effectively mechanical and therefore non-testimonial response.183 In
Hubbell, by contrast, the Court held that Fifth Amendment prevented the
government’s request for documents whose existence was unknown and
whose contents could not be described with any specificity.184 The
privilege applied in Hubbell because providing the documents required
the suspect’s active participation, and thereby made use of the “contents
of his own mind.”185 Although the testimonial product was essentially
identical to that in Fisher, because the existence and location of the
documents were not a “foregone conclusion,”186 the testimonial process
revealed to the government the suspect’s knowledge that the documents
both existed and also were within his own possession.187 It was the
process and not the product of subpoenaed information that made the
evidence count as testimonial.
The Court also took this approach in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, which
involved a right to silence appeal to an answer to a question about the
date of the defendant’s sixth birthday at a sobriety check.188 At a drunk
driving stop, an officer asked Inocencio Muniz to perform “three
standard field sobriety tests: a ‘horizontal gaze nystagmus’ test, a ‘walk
180. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 593 (1990).
181. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
182. 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
183. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (acknowledging that “[t]he act of producing evidence in
response to a subpoena . . . has communicative aspects of its own”).
184. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44-45.
185. Id. at 43.
186. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
187. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44-45.
188. 496 U.S. 582, 587-88 (1990).
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and turn’ test, and a ‘one leg stand’ test.”189 Muniz failed all three.190
He was arrested and driven to the police station, where the officer
videotaped his slurred responses to questions including his “name,
address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age.”191
After “stumbling over his address and age,” Muniz was asked whether
he knew “the date of [his] sixth birthday[.]”192 He replied, “No, I
don’t.”193
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan distinguished the physical
qualities of Muniz’s slurred speech from the testimonial qualities of the
sixth birthday question.194 The “slurred nature of his speech” involved
Muniz’s “physical inability to articulate words in a clear manner due to
‘the lack of muscular coordination of his tongue and mouth.’”195 The
videotape evidence of the slurring, in isolation, constituted a physical
process, which was “not itself testimonial.”196 By contrast, the sixth
birthday question was testimonial because it required Muniz to make
active use of his confused mental state.197 Inferring Muniz’s level of
intoxication from his inability to answer a simple question turned on the
process of his transmitting information about his drunkenness. Or so
Justice Brennan contended:
The Commonwealth . . . argue[s] that this incriminating inference does
not trigger the protections of the Fifth Amendment privilege because
the inference concerns “the physiological functioning of [Muniz’s]
brain,” . . . which is asserted to be every bit as “real or physical” as the
physiological makeup of his blood and the timbre of his voice. But
this characterization addresses the wrong question; that the “fact” to be
inferred might be said to concern the physical status of Muniz’s brain
merely describes the way in which the inference is incriminating. The
correct question for present purposes is whether the incriminating
inference of mental confusion is drawn from a testimonial act or from
physical evidence.198

For evidence to count as “testimonial,” Justice Brennan argued, it
was not enough for the accused simply to impart the information from
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 585.
Id.
Id. at 585-86.
Id. at 586.
Id.
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 590-91 (1990).
Id. at 590 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 598-99.
Id. at 593.
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his body or mind; he must also take an active and deliberate part in
transferring that information to the government. A “testimonial act”
requires that the suspect exercise control over the transmission of
information; mere submission to a state’s drawing out of information is
not enough.199
V. THE MIND-BODY DISTINCTION IN FIFTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
How does the Court’s distinction between testimonial and physical
evidence apply to the use of involuntary and incriminating neuroscience
evidence in a criminal trial? Consider the reflections of distinguished

199. In the next section, I challenge the jurisprudential distinction between testimonial and
physical evidence. I am not the first to do so. Four scholarly critiques are prominent. First,
Richard Nagareda has argued that the physical/testimonial distinction is at odds with the historical
understanding of what it means “to be a witness” under the Fifth Amendment, which he says is to
produce compelled evidence, whether it is physical or testimonial in nature. Richard A. Nagareda,
Compulsion “to be a Witness” and the Resurrection of Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575, 1658-59
(1999). See also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49-56 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Second, Mike Redmayne has argued that “the most compelling rationale for the privilege is that it
serves as a distancing mechanism, allowing defendants to disassociate themselves from
prosecutions, [which] . . . suggests that no distinction should be drawn between requirements to
speak and requirements to provide the authorities with documents, blood samples and the like.”
Mike Redmayne, Rethinking the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
209, 209 (2007). Third, Susan Easton has argued that there are no principled grounds on the basis
of which to distinguish the communicative qualities of evidence that the Court has classified as
“physical” (e.g., bodily samples or markings like scars and tattoos) as opposed to “testimonial”
(e.g., words or gestures intended to impart information). SUSAN EASTON, THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT
TO SILENCE, 217-18 (2d ed. 1998). “[W]hile the distinction might be justified on grounds of policy
or expediency,” Easton concludes, “nonetheless it is artificial and problematic, because both
samples and speech are subject to similar considerations and arguments.” Id. at 220. Finally,
Daniel Seidman and Alex Stein argue that “a suspect’s ability to tell uncontradicted lies can impose
externalities because guilty suspects might harm innocent suspects by pooling with them through
fabrications, lies, or omissions.” Seidman & Stein, supra note 30, at 480; see also STEIN, supra
note 91, at 158-64, 200-04. The question for Seidman and Stein is not whether evidence is
“physical” or “testimonial” in nature, but instead whether the evidence can be manipulated in a way
that harms innocent defendants by making it possible for guilty defendants to pass off lies as truths,
thereby rendering the latter less credible and less capable of protecting the innocent. Id. at 476.
Seidman and Stein argue that courts should replace the physical/testimonial distinction as a test for
right-to-silence protection with a substitute distinction between externality-laden and externalityfree evidence, according to which “only the existence of a meaningful fabrication alternative should
. . . activate the privilege.” Id. at 480. My account is different from these four accounts in two
important respects. First, I draw on evidence from cognitive neuroscience and metaphysical
philosophy to challenge the very coherence of the physical/testimonial distinction. I argue that the
distinction takes for granted a conceptual division of mind from body that new research has exposed
as false. Second, my account is the only one that can explain why the Fifth Amendment should
prohibit the compelled brain imaging technology to extort incriminating thoughts from an unwilling
suspect.
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jurist Hans A. Linde, former professor at the University of Oregon Law
School and Associate Justice of Oregon Supreme Court from 1977 to
1990.200 Writing in concurrence in the otherwise unremarkable case of
State v. Lyon,201 which held that polygraph tests were inadmissible as
evidence due to insufficient reliability,202 Justice Linde expressed his
widely shared but difficult-to-articulate reluctance to embrace even
demonstrably reliable polygraph evidence:203
I doubt the uneasiness about electrical lie detectors would disappear
even if they were refined to place their accuracy beyond question.
Indeed, I would not be surprised if such a development would only
heighten the sense of unease and the search for plausible legal
objections.204

Justice Linde said he would hesitate to admit into evidence any
interrogation method, no matter how reliable, that purports to verify
veracity in the thoughts of criminal suspects.205 Citing a pair of obscure
1956 law review articles206 discussing a German case207 that denied
admission of inculpatory polygraphy results on grounds of “personal
dignity,”208 Justice Linde argued that polygraph testing threatened to
undermine certain “fundamental tenets about human personhood.”209
Justice Linde’s concern about personhood had two parts. First, he

200. See generally INTELLECT AND CRAFT: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF HANS A. LINDE TO
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (Robert F. Nagel ed., 1995); Symposium on the Work of Justice
Hans Linde, 70 OR. L. REV. 679 (1991); Sanford Levinson, Tiers of Scrutiny—From Strict Through
Rational Basis—and the Future of Interests: Commentary on Fiss and Linde, 55 ALB. L. REV. 745,
746 (1992) (referring to Linde as “easily one of the three most important state court judges in this
century”).
201. 744 P.2d 231 (Or. 1987).
202. See id. at 232.
203. Id. at 240 (Linde, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 238 (Linde, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 238. See also Kittay, supra note 113, at 1390 (“[E]ven if fMRI technology could
fully deliver on its potential, hopes of being welcomed in the courtroom are exceptionally
hamstrung.”).
206. Henry J. Kaganiec, Lie Detector Tests and “Freedom of the Will” in Germany, 51 NW. U.
L. REV. 446, 449 (1956) (arguing that coerced polygraph tests to “disclose the otherwise concealed
psychic structure of the accused . . . are an . . . attempt to discover what might be present only in the
unconscious of the accused”); Helen Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69
HARV. L. REV. 683, 693 (1956) (arguing that concern about “human dignity” weigh against the
admission of incriminating polygraph tests).
207. Lyon, 744 P.2d at 240 (Linde J., concurring); see 5 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof, West Germany Supreme
Court] (1954), cited in Silving, supra note 206, at 688-89, and Kaganiec, supra note 206, at 446.
208. Lyon, 744 P.2d at 240 (Linde J., concurring).
209. Id.
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worried that admitting polygraph testing into the courtroom would
compromise the performative character of criminal trials, which he
regarded as a constitutive element “underlying our legal and social
institutions.”210 I take my cue from his second argument that the use of
polygraph testing threatened to reduce subjects to “electrochemical
systems to be certified as truthful or mendacious by a machine.”211
Justice Linde conceded that the “function of detecting a lie” among
suspects and witnesses is undoubtedly a “valuable” one in the American
criminal justice system,212 and that the polygraph is not altogether
unique among interrogation techniques that seek to achieve this worthy
objective by “turn[ing] its subject into an object.”213 But polygraph
testing is different in kind, Justice Linde argued, because of the
“[i]nconsistency of physiological lie detection with fundamental tenets
about human personhood [that] has been important in European
objections to the polygraph, reflecting Christian and Kantian
philosophical traditions as much as doubts of its accuracy.”214 Though
he did not elaborate as to what precisely those “tenets about human
personhood” consisted of,215 Justice Linde overstated such concerns as
they apply to polygraph testing,216 since polygraphy yields unreliable
results that are vulnerable to manipulation by subjects, interrogators, and
evaluators.217 Justice Brennan’s reflections on the use of involuntary
210. Id. at 240-41 (“The cherished courtroom drama of confrontation, oral testimony and cross
examination is designed to let a jury pass judgment on [the] truthfulness [of witnesses] and on the
accuracy of their testimony.”).
211. Id. at 240.
212. Id. at 239 (Linde, J. concurring) (“[T]he lie detector only purports to detect whether a
person is uttering a lie,” which “[b]eyond doubt . . . is often a useful thing to know.”).
213. Id. (acknowledging that the basic relationship between the conclusions about truthfulness
and the physiological facts that polygraph testing attempts to “independently establish” are similar
in principle to accepted forensic techniques such as fingerprinting and blood testing for alcohol
content levels).
214. State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231, 239-40 (Or. 1987).
215. See id. at 240. For a compelling account of personhood applied to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, see Christian M. Halliburton, How Privacy Killed Katz: A Tale of Cognitive Freedom
and the Property of Personhood as Fourth Amendment Norm, 42 AKRON L. REV. 803 (forthcoming
2009) (Part III.B).
216. See James R. McCall, The Personhood Argument Against Polygraph Evidence, Or “Even
If the Polygraph Really Works, Will Courts Admit the Results?”, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 925, 941-43
(1998).
217. As Department of Justice lawyer Michael R. Dreeben testified during oral argument in
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998), “[t]he fundamental unreliability of polygraph
evidence is underscored . . . [by] the possibility that countermeasures can defeat any test.” Oral
Argument Transcript of Michael R. Dreeben on behalf of the Petitioner, available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_96_1133/argument/. See also Catherine M.
Polizzi, A New View into the Truth: Impact of a Reliable Deception Detection Technology on the
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testing to incriminate a criminal suspect extended beyond the facts of
Schmerber’s blood testing. Whatever application the “spirit and
history”218 dicta might have had for forensic neuroscience, it is not
binding precedent for any future cases. Thus, Schmerber does not
resolve whether brain fingerprinting is more like forms of evidence such
as speaking, writing, and nodding, which are protected by the Fifth
Amendment, or more like fingerprinting, breathalyzer tests, and
handwriting samples, which are not protected.
Whether the fitting analogy for neuroforensics is to traditionally
“testimonial” evidence, or instead to traditionally “physical” evidence, is
far from straightforward.219 Until recently, reliable information about a
subject’s substantive knowledge required that a suspect actively
communicate that information, whether by choosing to speak, write, or
nod. But now, forensic neuroscience enables law enforcement officials
to access communicative phenomena in a way that leaves the suspect
“no more control over the firing of neurons than Schmerber had in the
way his blood responded to the test.”220 Once a suspect’s blood has been
drawn, or EEG sensors affixed to his scalp, the results of the blood
alcohol tests or lie-detection results are, for both, altogether involuntary.
“[A]ny active participation on the part of the subject [of neuroscientific
testing] would be, like Schmerber’s participation in the blood extraction
and analysis, irrelevant to the results of the test.”221
Brain imaging is difficult to classify because it promises distinctly
testimonial-like information about the content of a person’s mind that is
packaged in demonstrably physical-like form, either as blood flows in
the case of fMRI, or as brainwaves in the case of EEG.222 Forensic
neuroscience measures physiological changes in the brain—chemical
reactions to an outside stimulus—that reveal communicative processes
such as recall and deception. When a subject is forced to undergo brain
fingerprinting, the information that the test elicits is not precisely the

Legal System, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 395, 398, 398 n.9 (1995) (“We are familiar
with the polygraph, the most widely used and most controversial method of lie detection.”);
Timothy B. Henseler, Comment, A Critical Look at the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in the
Wake of Daubert: The Lie Detector Fails the Test, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 1247, 1247 (1997) (“The
polygraph and other deception detection instruments have suffered through a tumultuous seventy
years in the American legal system.”).
218. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
219. Alexandra J. Roberts, Comment, Everything Old is New Again: Brain Fingerprinting and
Evidentiary Analogy, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 234, 268 (2006).
220. Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 16, at 368-69.
221. Id. at 369.
222. See Haynes et al., supra note 56, at 324.
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subject’s thoughts, at least in the way that we ordinarily tend to
experience our thoughts as the deliberate transmission of ideas such as “I
am familiar with the scene of the murder,” or “I recognize the murder
weapon.” In the India murder case, for example, the defendant Sharma
did not speak, write, nod, or take any other active measure to
communicate her thoughts in response to targeted stimuli. Instead, EEG
sensors detected patterns of electrical activity in her brain that
corresponded to a physical code for her stored knowledge, the
incriminating content of which was used to prosecute her for murder.
What makes brain imaging unique, therefore, is not only “that the
physical characteristics the scanner ‘observes’ are imperceptible to the
average observer.”223 The more important reason that neuroscientific
evidence is different is that it measures direct and involuntary brain
activity that cannot, like polygraph testing, be effectively controlled by
the subject undergoing interrogation.224 And because EEG and fMRI
test results appear in the form of high-resolution computer-generated
images, they are less likely than the polygraph to be misinterpreted by
biased or imperfect evaluators.225
What Justice Brennan failed to appreciate is that the distinction
between physical and testimonial evidence presupposes a flawed
dualism between body and mind. The physical/testimonial distinction
requires that exclusively mental (and not bodily) processes comprise
communicative meaning.226 A division of mind and body therefore
223. Thompson, supra note 38, at 348. But see id. at 357.
224. See Lee et al., supra note 108, at 163 (“[C]ontrolling one’s cerebral activity to avoid
detection is unfeasible.”).
225. See Giannelli, supra note 115, at 905 (“The examiner’s role cannot be overstated, because
it is the examiner who decides whether there is sufficient indication of deception.”); Silberman,
supra note 117, at 142.
226. Susan Easton suggests that the communicative meaning we attach to body language in
itself reveals the conceptual bankruptcy of Cartesian dualism. Easton states:
[I]t is generally accepted that non-verbal gestures, whether voluntary, subconscious or
involuntary, may communicate information, even where the individual does not “intend”
that behavior . . . . In everyday life people constantly look for visual clues and make
judgments according to demeanor, or the shape or position of the body, and often treat
them as better guides to mental attitudes than the spoken word.
EASTON, supra note 199, at 217. “While the distinction [between physical and testimonial
evidence] might be justified on grounds of policy or expediency,” Easton concludes, “nonetheless it
is artificial and problematic . . . .” Id. at 220. Easton concludes that the rigid physical/testimonial
distinction should be replaced with a continuum that extends from oral communication at one end of
the continuum; with body language (e.g., nodding) intended to communicate at the next point on the
continuum; unintentional non-verbal communications (e.g., sweating) after that; followed by
external bodily features (e.g., tattoos); then bodily materials voluntarily or involuntarily transmitted
(e.g., blood or hair); and finally materials from a dead person (e.g., DNA) at the other end of the
continuum. See id. at 218.
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underlies the doctrinal distinction between physical and testimonial
evidence. The so-called “mind-body problem is the problem of
understanding how . . . the water of the physical brain is turned into the
wine of consciousness.”227 Mind/body dualism conceives of the sphere
of human psychology as distinct from the sphere of human biology.228
The contemporary version of mind/body dualism was articulated by
René Descartes.229 Following Plato and Aristotle’s speculations that the
faculties of intellect or soul are distinct from the physical organism,230
Descartes argued for a divorce of mind from body, distinguishing mental
phenomena such as consciousness and self-awareness from material
organs such as even the brain.231 On this account, the mind directs the
body like a “ghost in the machine.”232
Advances in cognitive imaging reveal the folly in the conceptual
schism of mind and body.233 Neuroscientists agree that the complex
phenomena of thought and behavior can be explained in terms of the
neural activity of the brain.234 Recent research into the human nervous
system has uncovered the existence of discernible correlates in our brain
chemistry for what were once thought of as the purely philosophical and
psychological, including thoughts, emotions, and behaviors like
decision-making,235 free will,236 moral judgment,237 personality,238

227. Colin McGinn, Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?, 98 MIND 349, 349 (1989).
228. See W.D. Hart, Dualism, A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 265-67 (Samuel
Guttenplan ed., 1996).
229. See Howard Robinson, Dualism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2003), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries
/dualism/.
230. See, e.g., 1 PLATO, PLATONIS OPERA (E.A. Duke et al. eds., 1995); 2 ARISTOTLE,
METAPHYSICS (METAPHYSICA) (W.D. Ross ed., 1924).
231. GORDON BAKER & KATHERINE J. MORRIS, DESCARTES’ DUALISM, (1996) (citing René
Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), 2 THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF
DESCARTES 1-62 (John Cottingham et al. trans., 1984)).
232. BRENT GARLAND, NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF
JUSTICE 66 (2004).
233. See Nemeroff et al., supra note 12, at 672 (“Neuroimaging offers a powerful probe of
brain state, but we are now faced with metaphysical questions; i.e., what is a brain state, and how is
it related to the outward manifestations of behavior? This has the potential for degenerating into the
old mind-body duality of Descartes . . . .”).
234. See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1775, 1775 (2004) (describing the
very enterprise of cognitive neuroscience as the “understanding of the mind as brain”).
235. See, e.g., Lesley K. Fellows & Martha J. Farah, Different Underlying Impairments in
Decision-making Following Ventormedial and Dorsolateral Frontal Lobe Damage in Humans, 15
CEREB. CORTEX 58 (2005); Antonio R. Damasio, How the Brain Creates the Mind, SCI. AM., at 4
(2002) (originally appearing in December 1999 issue).
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consciousness,239 and the self.240 Among these neuroscientific insights is
the discovery that even the most sophisticated operations of mind are
deeply integrated with the mechanical operations of biological
organisms.241
Brain imaging technologies can localize complex
psychological and behavioral functions to specific neural regions
through spatial and temporal resolution of functional markers in the
brain.242
That the mystery we associate with our thoughts and actions can be
reduced to quantifiable networks of neural activity might be difficult to
accept.243 In one sense, new insight into the neurological basis of
behavior merely confirms what doctors suspected in 1848, when Phineas
Gage, a Vermont railroad worker, had a thirteen-pound iron rod driven
through his frontal lobe with such dramatic effects on his personality and
behavior that his friends declared that “Gage was no longer Gage.”244 In
another sense, research into the human nervous system significantly
advances our understanding of and confidence in the synthesis between
mind and body.245 Neuroimaging studies provide strong evidence that
there is no freestanding metaphysical being that tells our brains what to

236. See, e.g., Rudolph Friedrich Wagner & Hans Reinecker, Problems and Solutions: Two
Concepts of Mankind in Cognitive–Behavior Therapy, 57 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 401 (2003).
237. See, e.g., Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in
Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105 (2001); Jorge Moll et al., Functional Networks in Emotional
Moral and Nonmoral Social Judgments 16 NEUROIMAGE 696 (2002).
238. See, e.g., Turhan Canli & Zenab Amin, Neuroimaging of Emotion and Personality:
Scientific Evidence and Ethical Considerations, 50 BRAIN COGNITION 414 (2002).
239. See, e.g., Giulio Tononi & Gerald M. Edelman, Schizophrenia and the Mechanisms of
Conscious Integration, 31 BRAIN RES. REV. 391 (2000).
240. See, e.g., Seth J. Gillihan, & Martha J. Farah, Is Self Special? A Critical Review of
Evidence from Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience, 131 PSYCHOL. BULL. 76
(2005).
241. See Damasio, supra note 235, at 9 (“[B]y 2050, sufficient knowledge of biological
phenomena will have wiped out the traditional dualistic separations of body/brain, body/mind, and
brain/mind.”).
242. See DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED (1991).
243. See Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 16, at 369 (“[O]ur everyday conception of humanity still
reflects dualistic notions of body and non-physical mind or soul”). “Perhaps we think our minds are
too opaque to ever be laid bare by a machine,” another commentator speculates, “or perhaps we so
desperately cling to this last frontier of privacy that we are willing it to be impossible.” Kittay,
supra note 113, at 1394.
244. MALCOLM MACMILLAN, AN ODD KIND OF FAME: STORIES OF PHINEAS GAGE 11-13
(2000); JOHN FLEISCHMAN, PHINEAS GAGE: A GRUESOME BUT TRUE STORY ABOUT BRAIN
SCIENCE 2 (2004); Malcolm Macmillan, A Wonderful Journey through Skull and Brains: The
Travels of Mr. Gage’s Tamping Iron, 5 BRAIN & COGNITION 67, 85 (1986).
245. STEVEN R. QUARTZ & TERRENCE J. SEJNOWSKI, LIARS, LOVERS, AND HEROES: WHAT
NEW BRAIN SCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT HOW WE BECOME WHO WE ARE 138-41 (2002).
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think and do.246 Instead, the mind is intimately bound up with the whole
of the human organism, while the organism works together with both
body and brain. This neuroscientifically informed picture of the
integrated body and mind powerfully undermines the dualistic premise
upon which the physical/testimonial distinction is built.
Recognizing the incoherence of mind/body dualism prompts us to
acknowledge that what we really care about is the individual’s control
over his thoughts. The relevant difference between a person’s thoughts
and his blood is neither that his thoughts communicate information that
his blood does not, nor that thinking requires the use of communicative
processes that bleeding does not. The relevant difference is instead that
our blood is readily separable from what we think important about us,
whereas our thoughts are not.247 Conventional forms of criminal
evidence can disclose all sorts of personal and private information about
me—where I was, what I did, or why I did it. But when the state seizes
my photographs, handwriting samples, or DNA, it does not deprive me
of control over my mental life. It does not, that is, compromise my
ability to be in command of the use and disclosure of my thoughts.
Compelled brain imaging, by contrast, does compromise this ability.
The notion of mental control has normative significance because our
thoughts are what anchor each of us as an individual person with an
uninterrupted autobiographical narrative.248 It is not just that physical
manifestations of brain function correspond to the exercise of subjective
awareness; it is, moreover, that those neural transmissions are, as the
organ of mind and consciousness, what we tend to think of as most

246. See studies discussed in ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON,
AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 24-30, 258-60 (2005).

247. Neuroscientist Donald Kennedy, editor of the journal Science, suggests that he seeks to
keep his “brainome” private because “[i]t is way too close to who I am.” Major Talks on Addiction,
Neuroethics, and Depression Highlight Neuroscience 2003, NEUROSCIENCE Q. (Winter 2004),
http://web.sfn.org/index.cfm?pagename=neuroscienceQuarterly_04winter_neuroscience; New York
City Bar Association, Report from the Committee on Science and Law, Are Your Thoughts Your
Own? ‘Neuroprivacy’ and the Legal Implications of Brain Imaging (2005),
http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/Neuroprivacy-revisions.pdf (citing Harrington v. Iowa, 659
N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003)).
248. Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio refers to these features of selfhood as “the individuality
and continuity of a living organism.” Antonio R. Damasio, Mental Self: The Person Within, 423
NATURE 227, 229 (2003). See also Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging Information: A
Case for Neuro Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 470 (2007) (exploring the “possibility
that fMRI will reveal back to the individual . . . stories that are inconsistent with the individual’s
dominant life narrative”).
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important about who we are.249 At the core, that is, we think of
ourselves as beings capable of self-reflection. The Fifth Amendment
protects a suspect’s control over his thoughts from unwanted
government access and use.250

249. See GARLAND, supra note 232, at 34; see also HENRY T. GREELY, NEUROETHICS AND
ELSI: SOME COMPARISONS AND CONSIDERATIONS (2004), http://perpich.com/neuroed/archive
/139.pdf. Greely states:
[I] am more than my genes. The genes are an important part of me, but I can be certain
that they are not my essence; they are not my soul. When we shift that notion to the
neuroscience area, though, I am not so confident. Is my consciousness—is my brain—
me? I am tempted to think it is.
Id.
250. The notion of protecting the individual’s control over the use of his thoughts is not
altogether foreign to Supreme Court reflections on the constitutional right to silence. In United
States v. Nobles, the majority wrote that the Fifth Amendment prohibits “state intrusion to extract
self-condemnation” by “protect[ing] a ‘private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought.’”
422 U.S. 225, 233 (1975) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973)); see also
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 126 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Physical acts will
constitute testimony if they probe the state of mind, memory, perception, or cognition of the
witness.”). Professor Richard Uviller also argued as early as 1987 that “personal control over the
production of cognitive evidence, free of official coercion, is guaranteed by the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment.” See H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal
Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137,
1137 (1987). In light of Hubbell’s language emphasizing protection of the “contents of [a
suspect’s] own mind,” United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000), Professor Uviller took
Justice Brennan’s opinion in Schmerber to mean that “no one can be forced to divulge cerebral
evidence, to speak the contents and products of the mind.” Uviller, supra note 175, at 313. Ronald
Allen and Kristin Mace have since built on Uviller’s insights to argue that the privilege applies to
“the substantive content of cognition,” which they define as “the intellectual processes of acquiring,
storing, retrieving, and using knowledge . . . that allow one to gain and make use of substantive
knowledge and to compare one’s ‘inner world’ (previous knowledge) with the ‘outside world’
(stimuli such as questions from an interrogator).” Allen & Mace, supra note 39, at 246-47. Allen
and Mace suggest that the Court has implicitly taken “testimony” to mean “substantive cognition,”
that is, the “contents of [one’s] own mind,” or “thoughts” that “result in holding or asserting
propositions with truth value,” for example, that a person was present at the scene of a crime, or
that he recognizes the victim, or took part in the act in question. See id. at 266-67, 267 n.107
(citing Doe v. United States (Doe II), 487 U.S. 201, 211 (1988)) (quoting Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973); Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)); United States v.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000) (also quoting Doe II and Curcio); see also Braswell v. United
States, 487 U.S. 99, 126 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In proscribing the compulsion of
incriminating “testimony,” they argue, the Court is actually saying that state action cannot compel
the revelation of these sorts of thoughts from the criminal suspect. Allen & Mace, supra note 39, at
266-67. On this account, the right to silence guarantees “that the government may not compel
revelation of the incriminating substantive results of compelled cognition.” Id. at 268.
However, Allen and Mace define protected cognition too narrowly. See id. at 266-67, 267 n.107.
Because their theory of “compelled cognition” incorporates the narrow precedential focus on those
“propositions with truth-value” that are prompted by state action, id. at 268, their account would
deny Fifth Amendment protection in a hypothetical case in which police reliably scanned a
suspect’s mind for incriminating thoughts, provided that state officials did nothing to provoke or
induce those thoughts, such as posing a question, or presenting the suspect with an image or
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At least three objections may be raised against this account of the
right to silence. The first objection is that advances in forensic
neurotechnology could shift the landscape of moral perceptions to
eliminate the mismatch I identified between existing right-to-silence
rationales and intuitions about the privilege’s application to brain
imaging techniques. This objection underestimates the human faculty of
impulse and imagination. Recall the Indian murder case, in which police
were able to use brain imaging techniques to extort incriminating
thoughts from the unwilling suspect. This vision is not so different, and
less radical in fact, than similar possibilities portrayed in contemporary
film and literature such as George Orwell’s 1984251 and Steven
Spielberg’s Minority Report.252 Popular media prompt us to reflect on or
at least acknowledge the possibility of mind-reading devices and of
government access to the thoughts of individuals. The premise of the
Indian case should not, therefore, be so unfamiliar to most people that
their present intuitions could not be taken as a reliable guide to their
intuitions in a world in which such technologies were no longer
imagined, but real, and their use by police interrogators were no longer
impossible but routine. If present intuitions are a reliable guide, any
divergence with existing principles is unlikely to disappear if the
hypothetical were to become reality.
The second objection is that protection of a suspect’s control over
his thoughts cannot explain why the state can compel even confessions
that are self-incriminating with a grant of immunity,253 or why the
privilege traditionally applies only to incriminating evidence or to selfincriminating evidence.254 The immunity exception is overstated,

recording that was relevant to the victim or crime scene. See William Federspiel, Comment, 1984
Arrives: Thought(crime), Technology, and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 865,
896-97 (2008). Michael Pardo tries to resolve the gaps left by Allen and Mace to argue that the
Self Incrimination Clause “appl[ies] when the government compels the tests in order to obtain
evidence of the incriminating informational content of subjects’ propositional attitudes,” including
“inductive evidence of their beliefs, knowledge, and other mental states.” Pardo, supra note 35, at
331-32. But Pardo’s account of the Fifth Amendment suffers from similar limitations. He
concedes that his version of the privilege “would not preclude compelled tests when used for any
purpose other than those that rely on incriminating propositional content. For example, if the tests
could be used to determine mental capacity, intent, bias, voluntariness, etc., without relying on
incriminating propositional content, then the privilege would not preclude such uses.” Id. at 332
n.205.
251. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
252. MINORITY REPORT (DreamWorks 2002).
253. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445-47 (1972).
254. See Stuntz, supra note 25, at 1232-34 (“The privilege applies only to testimony that is
incriminating.”).
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however, since “use immunity” applies narrowly to the act of production
only.255
While subpoenaed documents are not protected from
government use under 18 U.S.C. §6002, the state cannot use whatever
information is obtained from that act of production, whether directly or
indirectly, to criminally prosecute the suspect.256 The second point is
that compelled evidence has not traditionally been protected under the
Fifth Amendment unless it counts as both incriminating—in the sense
that it could “furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute”257—and also self-incriminating—in the sense that the
information is sought to incriminate the subject himself, as opposed to
someone else, even family or friends.258 This restraint on the privilege
implies that, provided prosecutors did not use the information derived
from compelled brain imaging, either directly or indirectly, as evidence
against the suspect himself in a criminal proceeding, then the Fifth
Amendment would not prohibit the state from gaining unwanted access
to his mental life.
I reply by proposing that judges refine these limits on the right to
silence, as they apply to state action that would deny a suspect control
over the use of her thoughts. Whether in the course of interrogation,259
trial,260 or sentencing,261 when state officials seek to acquire information
that would deprive individuals of control over their thoughts, then
traditional limitations on the privilege against self-incrimination should
not apply. This exception is sufficiently narrow in scope and modest in
practice and does not, however, change what it means for a person “to be
a witness against himself.”262

255. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994).
256. Exceptions to this rule include prosecution for perjury, for giving a false statement, or for
failing to comply with the subpoena order. See id.
257. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 190 (2004)
(quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
258. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956).
259. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (upholding a constitutional due process right to
remain silent after arrest without later penalty); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment requires that a suspect be warned of his right to silence before
any custodial interrogation).
260. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that the Fifth Amendment prohibits
prosecutors and judges from commenting adversely on a defendant’s failure to testify in a criminal
proceeding).
261. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321, 330 (1999) (extending application of the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination to criminal sentencing
proceedings).
262. U.S. CONST., amend. V.
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The third objection is that concerns about mental control, even if
valid, should not take moral priority over the social goals of criminal
justice, including the punishment of the guilty and the prevention of
crime.263 “There is nothing intrinsic in privacy and other individualist
values,” some Fifth Amendment scholars have argued, “that should
allow them to trump such objectives of the criminal justice system as
deterrence and retribution.”264 Yet much in modern political theory has
devoted itself to the proposition that each person possesses rights over
which considerations of the common good cannot take precedence.
Respect for the individual, this way of thinking goes, lies in conceiving
of her both analytically as more than just one among a collective, whose
group interests may not be fused together into a single sum total; and
also normatively as an end in herself, who may not be used exclusively
for purposes incompatible with her own.265 What John Rawls referred to
as “the plurality and distinctness of individuals,”266 and Robert Nozick
as “the fact of our separate existences,”267 demands deference to certain
liberties that even the well-being of society as a whole cannot override.
Worthy and serious though the goals of the criminal justice system are,
they fail to outweigh the injury to the individual that is done when the
state deprives a suspect of control over his mental life.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law provides principles to guide research and technology of the
human brain; so too can advances in cognitive neuroscience shape and
inform the law.268
Emerging brain imaging technology forces us to reckon with the
prospect of evidence-gathering techniques that would enable the state to
extract information directly from a suspect’s brain, in a way that affords
her no opportunity for control over the transmission of that information.
In so doing, forensic neuroscience reveals a tension between existing
accounts of the right to silence and the plausible idea that individuals
have a right of control over their thoughts from unwanted extraction or
use by the government. Some scholars have tried to resolve this tension
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See Seidman & Stein, supra note 30, at 455.
Id.
See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 62 (1999).
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 26 (rev. ed. 1999).
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33 (1974).
See Adina Roskies, A Case Study of Neuroethics: The Nature of Moral Judgment, in
NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 17, 18 (Judy Illes ed.,
2006).
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by comparing brain imaging to more familiar types of criminal evidence.
They argue that if we set aside reliability concerns, then whatever
suspicion with which we might greet the introduction of neuroscience to
the courtroom is in principle indistinguishable from misguided resistance
to forensic advances of the past such as DNA, X-rays, and
photography.269 Yet this analogical approach is incomplete.
That we balk at the prospect of reliable brain imaging, ostensibly
similar though it appears to accepted forms of evidence, suggests that the
dominant right-to-silence framework—with its arguments about
reliability, excuse, and psychological cruelty—cannot capture the values
at stake in matters of involuntary lie-detection. The physical/testimonial
distinction underlying self-incrimination doctrine is unlikely to protect a
criminal suspect from the compelled use of fMRI or EEG. Yet this key
distinction presupposes a flawed conception of mind/body dualism.
Brain imaging techniques that deprive individuals of control over their
thoughts violate the “spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.”270

269. See Pardo, supra note 35, at 311 (“Photography, it was thought, potentially could usurp
the power of courts to determine facts by shifting power to photography experts, and away from
courts, to determine the true nature of reality. None of this happened, of course, because the
evidence was eventually assimilated . . . .”).
270. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
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